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Different views have been put forward to explain why 
most firms in developing countries operate informally. 
One view argues that informal-business owners are 
entrepreneurs who do not register their firm because 
the regulation process is too complex. Another argues 
that informal-business owners are people trying to 
make a living while searching for a wage job. This paper 
contributes to recent literature that argues that both 
factors are at work. The author uses discriminant analysis 
to separate informal business owners into two groups: 
those with personal characteristics similar to wage 
workers, and those with traits similar to formal-business 
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owners. The paper then examines how the two groups 
were affected by a business registration reform in Mexico. 
Informal-business owners from the second group were 
more likely to register their business after the reform. By 
contrast, informal-business owners from the first group 
were less likely to register but more likely to become 
wage workers after the reform. This is consistent with 
the finding in Bruhn (2008 and 2011) that the reform 
led to job creation. It also explains why the earlier papers 
find that the reform didn’t affect the number of new 
registrations by all informal business owners. 
A Tale of Two Species: 
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1 Development Research Group, The World Bank. mbruhn@worldbank.org. I thank David McKenzie for valuable 
comments. 1.  Introduction 
Most firms in developing countries are informal, that is they operate without registering with the 
government (OECD, 2009, and data from IFC, 2010). This can pose disadvantages to firms since 
they may be subject to government penalties and they may not have access to low cost sources of 
financing, government contracts, and public contract enforcement (Jansson and Chalmers, 2001). 
It can also limit firms’ market size since they cannot issue formal receipts to customers 
(McKenzie and Sakho, 2010). From the government’s perspective, informality may result in 
lower tax collection, restricting the government’s ability to finance public services (Levy, 2008). 
Historically, different views have been put forward to explain why many firms operate 
informally. One view, associated with De Soto (1989), argues that informal business owners are 
viable entrepreneurs who are being held back from registering their firm due to complex 
regulation. This regulation includes the initial procedures for obtaining an operating license, as 
well as ongoing compliance costs for registered firms, such as taxes and labor contributions. 
Another view, expressed for example by Tokman (1992), sees informal business owners as 
individuals who are trying to make a living while they search for a wage job. 
Several papers have developed theoretical models supporting either view
2. Other papers 
examine empirically which view is correct, leading to different conclusions (Maloney, 1999 and 
2004, and La Porta and Shleifer, 2008 and 2011). Recently, some have emphasized that informal 
firms are heterogeneous and that a mix of both views may be correct (OECD, 2009). Self-
reported statistics support this mixed view. In World Bank Enterprise Survey data on informal 
firms in Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauritius, about 62 percent of business owners report 
that they started their firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, while the remainder says 
they were not able to find a satisfactory job elsewhere (Amin, 2009). Maloney (2004) also 
presents similar numbers for Brazil and Mexico. 
De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2010) investigate heterogeneity in the informal sector 
in Sri Lanka through discriminant analysis, a tool used by biologists to separate animals or plants 
into species on the basis of easily measured characteristics. The authors classify a sample of self-
                                                           
2 See for example Bennett and Estrin (2009), Bennett (2010), and Straub (2005) for models supporting the De Soto 
view and Fields (1975) and Fields (2004) for models supporting the Tokman view. 2 
 
employed microenterprise owners into those who have personal characteristics similar to wage 
workers and those who have characteristics similar to larger firm owners
3. Their analysis shows 
that about 70 percent of microenterprise owners fall into the first category and 30 percent fall 
into the second category. 
This paper uses the context of a reform in Mexico that simplified local business 
registration procedures to provide further evidence for the existence of two different species of 
informal business owners. The business registration reform was implemented in different 
municipalities at different times, providing an estimation strategy for identifying its effects on 
formal firm creation and employment. Bruhn (2008 and 2011) shows that the reform increased 
the number of registered business owners, and that it also created additional wage jobs in eligible 
sectors. However, the results indicate that the increase in registered business owners was due to 
former wage earners opening businesses. Former informal business owners were not more likely 
to register their business after the reform, on average.  
In this paper, I follow the approach of De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff and use 
discriminant analysis based on personal characteristics of informal business owners to separate 
them according to their potential for becoming formal business owners. The discriminant 
analysis classifies half of the informal business owners in my sample as wage workers and the 
other half as formal business owners. 
I then examine the impact of the business registration reform on these two separate 
groups and find that informal business owners from the formal business owner species are 14.3 
percent more likely to register their business after the implementation of the reform. In contrast, 
informal business owners from the wage worker species are less likely to become formal 
business owners after the reform, but they are 20.4 percent more likely to become wage workers. 
This is consistent with the finding in Bruhn (2008 and 2011) that the reform led to job creation 
and it explains why the effect of reform is zero for the group of all informal business owners 
taken together.  
                                                           
3 Employers and wage workers differ along many dimensions, including personal background characteristics, 
attitudes, and cognitive ability measures. Djankov et al (2005 and 2006) also find this to be the case in Brazil, China, 
and Russia. 3 
 
Overall, these results support the argument that the informal sector consists of different 
types of business owners. Some operate informally due to stringent regulation and simplifying 
regulation can entice them to register their business. Others run informal businesses while they 
are looking for a job and they switch to being wage earners when more job opportunities arise. 
The evidence in this paper does not exclude the possibility that there could be more than two 
different species of informal business owners. For example, there may be a third group of 
individuals that does neither want to formalize nor become a wage earner. In my data, a large 
number of firms continue to operate informally even after the business registration reform. In 
fact, evidence from Bolivia and Indonesia suggests that not all informal firms benefit equally 
from registering and for some firms in Bolivia, formalization lowers profits (McKenzie and 
Sakho, 2010, and McCulloch, Schulze, and Voss, 2010, see also Perry et al, 2007). 
This paper is also related to Hsieh and Klenow’s (2009) argument that low aggregate 
productivity in developing countries is in part due to misallocation of resources across firms and 
that complex regulation is one factor than can contribute to this misallocation. The findings of 
this paper suggest that business registration reform allows individuals to better sort across 
occupations, thus promoting reallocation of resources and potentially raising productivity. More 
broadly, the results imply that studies of regulatory reforms may need to go beyond measuring 
average effects since reforms can have important effects on productivity through reallocation. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
classification of informal business owners into wage worker and formal business owner species. 
Section 3 discusses the business registration reform and hypotheses for how this reform affects 
different species of informal business owners. Section 4 lays out the identification strategy and 
summarizes transitions into different occupations in the pre-reform period. Section 5 presents the 
impact estimates of the reform on firm formalization and transitions on wage work. Section 6 
concludes. 
2.  Mexican Employment Survey Data and Species Classification 
The main data source used in this paper is the Mexican National Employment Survey (ENE), the 
survey that the Mexican government relies on for calculating unemployment statistics and the 
size of the informal sector. The ENE was conducted quarterly starting in 2000-II and covers a 4 
 
random sample of approximately 150,000 households. Each household remains in the survey for 
five consecutive quarters. I use data for 2000-II to 2004-IV (19 quarters in total)
4. 
The ENE includes detailed information on each individual’s employment status and 
occupation. In particular, the survey asks all currently employed individuals whether they work 
as wage workers or whether they are employers or self-employed in their main job. I group 
employers and the self-employed together and call them business owners. The survey then asks 
these business owners whether their business is formally registered with the authorities. Close to 
50 percent of business owners report that their business is not registered with the authorities. I 
refer to these business owners as informal business owners
5. Among working age (20 to 65) 
individuals in the ENE, 49.5 percent are wage workers, 8.6 percent are formal business owners 
and 8 percent are informal business owners. The remaining individuals are not employed (either 
unemployed or not in the labor force). 
Personal background characteristics 
Following De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2010), I classify the group of informal business 
owners into wage worker and formal business owner species using discriminant analysis. As 
described in De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, discriminant analysis is a tool used by biologists 
to separate animals or plants into species on the basis of easily measured characteristics. For the 
species classification, De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff rely on a large number of background, 
ability, and attitude measures, collected through their own survey. I have to work with a less rich 
set of personal characteristics since the ENE only includes basic background characteristics for 
each individual: age, gender, marital status, education, whether or not the individual is a head of 
household, and whether or not the individual is a migrant (defined as living in a state that is 
different from the state where the person was born). The reason for using ENE data in this paper 
is that it is high frequency data with broad geographic coverage that allows me to identify 
informal business owners and to track them over time. These features are essential for the impact 
analysis performed in later sections of this paper. 
                                                           
4 After 2004-IV, the ENE was changed to a new survey, the ENOE, and some of the questions used to 
define the variables in this paper where modified, limiting comparability across the two surveys. 
5 Bruhn (2008) includes a detailed description of how I classified individuals into different occupation groups. 5 
 
Table 1 displays averages and standard deviations for the personal background 
characteristics, by occupation group. The sample here includes individuals in their first quarter of 
observation in the ENE before the business registration reform was implemented in the 
municipality where the individual lives. The stars on the averages for formal business owners 
and wage workers denote the statistical significance level of the difference in averages compared 
to informal business owners.  
The statistics in Table 1 show that informal business owners tend to be slightly younger 
than formal business owners, but they are 6.5 years older than wage workers, on average. A little 
over one-third of informal business owners are female, while only 27 percent of formal business 
owners are female, but 40 percent of wage workers are female. Informal business owners have 
lower levels of education than formal business owners and wage workers, with a much larger 
fraction having completed only primary school as opposed to higher education. Informal 
business owners are 6.8 percentage points less likely to be married than formal business owners, 
but ten percentage points more likely to be married than wage workers. Similarly, informal 
business owners are less (more) likely to be heads of household than formal business owners 
(wage workers). Finally, close to 23 percent of informal business owners and wage workers are 
migrants, but this number is higher among formal business owners (26 percent).  
Logistic regressions 
Table 2 displays the results from logistic regressions that examine more systematically the extent 
to which each personal characteristic is correlated with occupational choice, controlling for other 
characteristics. Column 1 reports marginal coefficients for the choice of being an informal vs. 
formal business owner. Age, being married, being a head of household and having higher levels 
of education are all negatively correlated with being an informal instead of a formal business 
owner
6. Females, on the other hand, are more likely to be informal instead of formal business 
owners. Column 2 shows that many of these correlations are reversed for the choice of being an 
informal business owner vs. a wage worker. Older individuals, people who are married or a head 
of household are more likely to be informal business owners than wage workers. However, 
higher levels of education are associated with a lower probability of being an informal business 
                                                           
6 The omitted education category in the regressions is less than primary education. 6 
 
owner instead of a wage worker. The coefficients in Column 3 indicate that age, being married, 
being a head of household, and having higher levels of education are correlated with being a 
formal business owner vs. a wage worker. In contrast, females and migrants are less likely to be 
formal business owners instead of wage workers.  
Overall, the results in Table 2 indicate that all of the characteristics included in the 
analysis statistically significantly contribute to predicting who in the sample is an informal 
business owner, a formal business owner, or a wage worker. One caveat though is that the 
combined predictive power of the variables in not high, as illustrated by the relatively low R-
squared of the regressions. Unfortunately, the ENE does not include additional personal 
background characteristics that could improve the predictive power of the analysis. I therefore 
view the classification described in the following paragraph as a lower bound for how well 
informal business owners can be grouped into species. 
Discriminant analysis 
Table 3 reports the results of the logistic discriminant analysis used to classify informal business 
owners into wage worker and formal business owner species based on the personal 
characteristics listed in Table 1. This analysis first obtains the combination of personal 
characteristics that best separates wage workers from formal business owners. It then applies the 
fitted model to the group of informal business owners, predicting who belongs to the wage 
worker species and who belongs to the formal business owner species. Panel A of Table 3 
displays as check of how successful the fitted model is at classifying individuals into species. 
When applying the fitted model to the groups of formal business owners and wage workers, it 
classifies close to 65 percent of each group correctly. For comparison, the richer set of personal 
background characteristics used in De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff allows them to classify up 
to 79 percent of the species groups correctly. Panel B of Table 3 shows that when I apply the 
fitted model to the group of informal business owners, it classifies about half of them as wage 
workers and the other half as formal business owners. 7 
 
3.  Business Registration Reform and Hypotheses 
In this section, I study the impact of a business registration reform in Mexico, the Rapid Business 
Opening System (SARE), on the occupational choices of informal business owners, keeping in 
mind their division into wage worker and formal business owner species. SARE simplified local 
business registration procedures, reducing the average the number of days, procedures, and 
office visits required to register a business, from 30.1 to 1.4, from 7.9 to 2.7, and from 4.2 to 1, 
respectively. The reform was organized by a federal agency, the Federal Commission for 
Improving Regulation (COFEMER), which had to coordinate with municipal governments since 
many business registration procedures are set locally in Mexico. As a result of this need for 
coordination, SARE was implemented in different municipalities at different times, starting in 
May 2002
7.  
Bruhn (2008) shows that the implementation of SARE increased the number of formal 
business owners by 5 percent. It also increased wage employment by 2.2 percent. However, the 
results indicate that the increase in formal business owners was due to former wage earners 
opening businesses. Former informal business owners were not more likely to register their 
business after the reform. This conclusion is based on the average effect of the reform on all 
informal business owners in the sample. The paper also separates informal business owners by 
whether they have any employees or not or by whether they have fixed or mobile premises, but it 
does not find any effect on business registration for any of these sub-groups of informal business 
owners. 
Bruhn (2008) relied on business characteristics to separate informal business owners into 
different groups, recognizing that the informal sector is heterogeneous and trying to isolate the 
informal business owners that would be most likely to register their business after a reform. 
However, De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff suggest that it may be more appropriate to use the 
personal characteristics of business owners to classify them according to their potential for 
becoming formal business owners. This paper thus revisits the earlier results from Bruhn (2008) 
and examines the impact of SARE separately for informal business owners that belong to the 
wage worker and formal business owner species, according to the discriminant analysis 
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performed in Section 2. I expect to find that only informal business owners from the formal 
business owner species are more likely to register their business after the implementation of 
SARE. In contrast, informal business owners from the wage worker species should be more 
likely to become wage workers after the reform since the reform also created more jobs. 
Testing these hypotheses sheds light on the effect of SARE on firm formalization and 
transitioning to wage work for different types of informal business owners. At the same time, it 
provides a test of the classification of informal business owners into wage worker and formal 
business owner species. That is, if I find that informal business owners from the wage worker 
(formal business owner) species are more likely to become wage workers (formal business 
owners) when a reform makes it easier to do so, this confirms the validity of the species 
classification. 
4.  Identification Strategy and Transitions into Different Occupations 
This paper follows the identification strategy in Bruhn (2008 and 2011) to measure the effects of 
SARE on business registration and transitions to wage employment of informal business owners. 
In particular, I exploit the fact that the reform was implemented in different municipalities at 
different points in time to estimate the following equation 
yict = ʱ + βc+ γt+ δSAREct + φEC1999∗t + εict, 
where the outcome variable yict is a dummy variable indicating the occupation (e.g. formal 
business owner, wage worker) of individual i living in municipality c in quarter t. The regression 
includes municipality fixed effects, βc, and quarter fixed effects, γt. The variable SAREct is the 
reform dummy and, for each municipality, it is equal to one for the quarter in which the reform 
was implemented and for all following quarters. The vector EC1999 consists of control variables 
from the 1999 Economic Census interacted with a linear time trend, t. These variables are log 
GDP per capita, log number of economic establishments per 1000 capita, log fixed assets per 
capita, and log investment per capita. The standard errors of the regressions are clustered at the 
municipality level. 
The coefficient δ measures the unbiased impact of SARE on outcomes yict under the 
assumption that the time trends of yict would have been parallel across municipalities in the 9 
 
absence of the reform. Bruhn (2008 and 2011) performs a number of checks suggesting that this 
assumption holds. Both the levels and the pre-reforms changes in outcomes variables do not 
display systematic statistical differences across municipalities in the sample. In line with Bruhn 
(2008 and 2011), the sample used in this paper here only includes the 34 municipalities that 
adopted SARE by December 2004
8. Municipalities that adopted the reform later or that have not 
yet adopted tend to be less comparable to the ones that adopted the reform early. 
In order to study the differential effect of SARE on informal business owners in the wage 
worker and formal business owner species, I make use of the panel structure of the ENE. For the 
analysis, I only keep the individuals who report being informal business owners when I first 
observe them in the pre-reform period. The species classification exercise in Section 2 assigns 
each of these individuals to a species based on the data from their first quarter of observation. I 
then drop the first quarter of observation for each person and use the remaining data in the 
regression outlined above, running separate regressions for the wage worker and formal business 
owner species
9. The outcome variables (occupation dummies) in these regressions can be 
interpreted as occupational transition probabilities. That this, they represent the average fraction 
of informal business owners that is employed in each occupation during the following quarters
10.  
Table 4 displays the probabilities of transitioning into different occupations in the pre-
reform period, indicating a high degree of mobility in the informal sector
11. Only 55 (44) percent 
of informal business owners in the formal business owner (wage worker) species remain 
informal business owners during the following quarters. About 12 percent of individuals in the 
formal business owner species switch to being formal business owners. This fraction is smaller 
                                                           
8 According to COFEMER’s website, by November 2011, 191 municipalities had adopted SARE 
(http://www.cofemer.gob.mx/contenido.aspx?contenido=122). 
9 Bruhn (2008 and 2010) also controls for personal background characteristics in the regressions. I do not include 
these variables here since they were already used to separate the sample into different species.  
10 Some industries were not eligible for SARE. In this paper, I only study the impact of SARE on informal business 
owners in eligible industries since individuals in non-eligible industries are not able to register their business 
through SARE. Informal business owners in eligible industries make up 96.5 percent of informal business owners in 
the ENE. 
11 High mobility across occupational sectors has also been observed in earlier work with the Mexican Labor Market 
Survey (Bosch and Maloney, 2006, and Woodruff, 2007). The labor market is similarly dynamic in Brazil (Bosch 
and Maloney, 2010). 10 
 
in the wage worker species (7.3 percent)
12. On the other hand, the wage worker species is more 
likely to transition into wage work during the following quarters, compared to the formal 
business owner species. A sizable fraction of each species also ends up not being employed at all 
during the following quarters. Overall, the transition patterns are consistent with the species 
classification. Compared to the wage worker species, individuals in the formal business owner 
species are more likely to remain informal business owners or become formal business owners, 
as opposed to becoming wage workers or not employed. 
As mentioned above, Bruhn (2008 and 2011) performs various tests that suggest that the 
identification strategy used to measure the effects of SARE is valid. Table 5 contains additional 
tests for the sample of informal business owners. Columns 1 and 2 display the results from 
taking only pre-reform data and running a regression of each occupation dummy on a variable 
that indicates in which quarter the municipality implemented the reform. The coefficients show 
that pre-reform transition probabilities are, for the most part, not statistically significantly 
correlated with the quarter of implementation. The only exception here is that, in the pre-reform 
period, individuals in the formal business owner species were more likely to remain informal 
business owners during the following quarters in municipalities that implemented the reform 
later rather than earlier. This correlation is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Columns 3 and 4 test the parallel trends identification assumption more directly. They 
show the coefficients from a regression of each occupation dummy variable in the pre-reform 
period on a time trend, the quarter of implementation variable, and the interaction of the two 
(scaled by 100). None of the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically significant, 
indicating that transition probabilities in the pre-reform period did not display time trends that 
varied systematically with the quarter of reform implementation. 
5.  Results 
Table 6 presents the estimated impacts of SARE on the occupational choices of informal 
business owners. Column 1 replicates the results from Bruhn (2008 and 2011), grouping all 
informal business owners together. The coefficients show no impact of SARE on the likelihood 
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previously informal or whether they close the informal business and open a new, formal business. However, I 
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of being a formal business owner or a wage earner for the group of all non-registered business 
owners. However, when I break up informal business owners into the two different species, more 
nuanced results emerge. As hypothesized, individuals from the formal business owner species 
are statistically significantly more likely to be formal business owners after the reform. The size 
of this effect is equal to an increase of 0.017 in the pre-reform transition probability of becoming 
a formal business owner listed in Table 4 (0.118). Thus, the reform caused 13.5 percent instead 
of 11.8 percent of informal business owners to become formal business owners over the 
following quarters. This effect is equivalent to a 14.3 percent increase in the transition 
probability (0.017/0.118). 
Informal business owners from the wage worker species, on the other hand, are less likely 
to become formal business owners after the reform. This explains why the effect of SARE is zero 
for the group of all informal business owners taken together. One possible reason why 
individuals from the wage worker species are less likely to be formal business owners is that they 
face increased competition from the individuals in the formal business owner species who 
transitioned to being formal business owners due to SARE. These individuals are plausibly better 
at running a formal business and may drive out or prevent entry into the formal sector of 
informal business owners from the wage earner species.  
Another possibility is that individuals from the wage earner species have a preference for 
working as wage earners rather than business owners. In fact, the results show that SARE led to 
an increase in the fraction of informal business owners from the wage earner species that 
transition to being wage earners. This is in line with my hypotheses and with the fact that SARE 
created more wage jobs in eligible sectors, as shown in Bruhn (2008 and 2011). Kaplan, Piedra 
and Seira (2007) also find that SARE increased the creation of formal jobs registered with the 
Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS). Table 5 shows that the positive effect of SARE on 
transitions to wage work for individuals in the wage earner species is only statistically significant 
for wage jobs that provide a contract. The magnitude of this effect is equivalent to a 20.4 percent 
(0.010/0.049) increase in the fraction of individuals from the wage worker species that transfer to 
being wage workers during the following quarters. The finding that informal business owners 
transition to formal jobs, i.e. jobs that provide a contract, is consistent with anecdotal evidence 12 
 
suggesting that a higher degree of income security is among the advantages that some informal 
business owners associate with wage jobs
13. 
Finally, the results in Table 6 indicate that informal business owners from the formal 
business owner species are more likely to remain informal business owners and less likely to be 
not employed at all (unemployed or out of the labor force). This could be due to increased 
demand for the products and services that these businesses sell. Bruhn (2008 and 2011) shows 
that SARE led to more wage employment and higher incomes for individuals who were 
previously not employed, which may increase demand. It could also mean that some informal 
business owners are choosing not to close their business since they aim to register the business 
through SARE at a later date. 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper uses discriminant analysis to separate informal business owners into a species that has 
characteristics similar to formal business owners and another species that has characteristics 
similar to wage workers. The analysis classifies about half of the sample into each group. I then 
examine the impact of a business registration reform in Mexico on these two species.  The results 
show that informal business owners from the formal business owner species are 14.3 percent 
more likely to register their business after the implementation of the reform. In contrast, informal 
business owners from the wage worker species are less likely to become formal business owners 
after the reform, but they are 20.4 percent more likely to become wage workers. This is 
consistent with the finding in Bruhn (2008 and 2011) that the reform led to job creation and it 
explains why the effect of the reform is zero for the group of all informal business owners taken 
together.  
The results in this paper support the argument that the informal sector consists of 
different types of business owners. Some operate informally due to stringent regulation and 
simplifying regulation can entice them to register their business. Others run informal businesses 
while they are looking for a job and they switch to being wage earners when more job 
opportunities arise. This heterogeneity among informal firms may be one reason why a 
randomized control trial from Peru that tries to encourage informal firm registration through 
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financial and technical assistance with the licensing process finds that only one out of four 
informal firms take up this incentive (Jaramillo, 2009). Some of the remaining informal business 
owners may prefer to become wage earners instead. Take-up rates of these types of program 
could potentially be improved by screening participating informal business owners first. As 
shown in this paper, even basic background characteristics can provide an insight into which 
informal business owners are more likely to formalize their business vs. become wage earners. 
Overall, policy interventions that try to reduce the size of the informal sector may need to 
target both firm formalization and job creation. The business registration reform in Mexico did 
both since it also incentivized former wage earners to open new formal businesses, thus freeing 
up wage jobs and creating additional formal jobs (Bruhn 2008 and 2011, and Kaplan, Piedra and 
Seira, 2007). Although the reform in Mexico had positive effects, the fraction of informal 
business owners transitioning to being formal business owners (13.5 percent in the formal 
business owner species) or wage workers with a contract (5.9 percent in the wage worker 
species) after the reform is still relatively small. Entry regulation is only one barrier to formal 
firm creation. Bringing a larger fraction of informal firms into the formal sector and creating 
additional jobs most likely also requires other reforms, such as tax reform (see also Fajnzylber, 
Maloney, and Montes-Rojas, 2011). 14 
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Table 1: Personal Background Characteristics 
  
 









     
Age  40.821  41.177***  34.271*** 
 
(11.701)  (10.797)  (34.271) 
 
     
Female  0.360  0.274***  0.400*** 
 
(0.480)  (0.446)  (0.490) 
Highest education level 
 
 
     Primary  0.314  0.196***  0.195*** 
 
(0.464)  (0.397)  (0.396) 
 
     
   Secondary  0.211  0.213  0.259*** 
 
(0.408)  (0.410)  (0.438) 
 
     
   High school  0.133  0.209***  0.250*** 
 
(0.340)  (0.406)  (0.433) 
 
     
   University  0.036  0.280***  0.190*** 
 
(0.186)  (0.449)  (0.392) 
 
     
Married  0.721  0.789***  0.620*** 
 
(0.449)  (0.408)  (0.485) 
 
     
Head of household  0.594  0.690***  0.465*** 
 
(0.491)  (0.463)  (0.499) 
 
     
Migrant  0.226  0.261***  0.229 
 
(0.418)  (0.439)  (0.420) 
 
     
Observations  32,452  34,276  205,935 
        Notes: The sample includes individuals in their first quarter of observation in the Mexican 
Labor Market Survey (ENE) before the business registration reform was implemented in the 
municipality where the individual lives. The stars on the averages for formal business owners 
and wage workers denote the statistical significance level of the difference in averages 
compared to informal business owners. Significance levels: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 
percent. 
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owners vs. wage 
workers 
Formal business 
owners vs. wage 
workers   
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
 
     
Age  -0.005***  0.003***  0.005*** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
     
Female  0.026***  0.002  -0.027*** 
 
0.006  0.002  0.002 
Highest education level       
   Primary  -0.179***  -0.032***  0.035*** 
 
(0.006)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
 
     
   Secondary  -0.307***  -0.069***  0.045*** 
 
(0.005)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
 
     
   High school  -0.385***  -0.095***  0.055*** 
 
(0.005)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
 
     
   University  -0.553***  -0.136***  0.099*** 
 
(0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
 
     
Married  -0.083***  0.016***  0.037*** 
 
(0.005)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
 
     
Head of household  -0.073***  0.010***  0.036*** 
 
(0.006)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
        Migrant  0.001  -0.002  -0.005*** 
 
(0.005)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
 
     
Pseudo R2  0.150  0.111  0.079 
Observations  66,728  238,387  240,211 
        Notes: The sample includes individuals in their first quarter of observation in the Mexican 
Labor Market Survey (ENE) before the business registration reform was implemented in the 
municipality where the individual lives. Coefficients are marginal effects from a logit 
regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The omitted education category is less 




Table 3: Species Classification 
     
Panel A: Formal business owner and wage worker samples 
  % of formal business owners correctly classified  65.40 
    % of wage workers correctly classified  64.10 
    Panel B: Informal business owner sample 
  % classified as formal business owner  49.38 






Table 4: Transition Probabilities in Pre-Reform Period 
      Average fraction of informal business owners that is employed in each 







  Informal business owner  0.551  0.441 
Formal business owner  0.118  0.073 
Wage worker  0.154  0.228 
   with contract  0.037  0.049 
   without contract  0.117  0.179 
Not employed  0.137  0.225 
Notes: This table only includes informal business owners in SARE eligible 
industries. About 4 percent of these individuals transition to occupations in 
non-eligible industries (mostly to being wage workers). These transition 
probabilities are not reported above, which is why the probabilities in the 
table do not add up to one. 
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Table 5: Are Pre-Reform Transition Probabilities Correlated with SARE 
Implementation Dates? 
            
Coefficient on quarter of 
implementation 
Coefficient on quarter of 
implementation interacted 

















(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
       
Informal business owner  0.007*  0.003  0.011  0.025 
 
(0.004)  (0.003)  (0.067)  (0.068) 
 
       
Formal business owner  -0.004  -0.003  0.009  -0.006 
 
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.044)  (0.026) 
 
       
Wage worker  -0.002  0.000  -0.036  -0.010 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.032)  (0.043) 
 
       
   with contract  -0.002  -0.002  -0.031  -0.028 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.027)  (0.023) 
 
       
   without contract  -0.000  0.002  -0.005  0.019 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.024)  (0.039) 
 
       
Not employed  0.001  0.000  0.026  0.000 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.031)  (0.043) 
              
          Notes: This table only includes informal business owners in SARE eligible industries and all 
occupation dummy variables refer to eligible industries only. All regressions use only pre-
reform data. Columns 1 and 2 display the results from running a regression of each 
occupation dummy on a variable that indicates in which quarter the municipality 
implemented the reform. Columns 3 and 4 show the coefficients from a regression of each 
occupation dummy variable on a time trend, the quarter of implementation variable, and 
the interaction of the two (scaled by 100). Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
municipality level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 
percent. 
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Table 6: Reform Impact 
           Coefficients on SARE dummy 
 
Species: 





Occupation dummy variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
        Informal business owner  0.012  0.023**  0.006 
 
(0.012)  (0.011)  (0.019) 
        Formal business owner  0.001  0.017**  -0.013** 
 
(0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
        Wage worker  -0.000  -0.014  0.011 
 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.013) 
           with contract  0.003  -0.004  0.010** 
 
(0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
           without contract  -0.003  -0.009  0.001 
 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.011) 
        Not employed  -0.011*  -0.023***  -0.001 
 
(0.006)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
        Observations  81,995  42,139  39,856 
        Notes: This table only includes informal business owners in SARE eligible industries 
and all dependent variables refer to eligible industries only.  Regressions include 
quarter and municipality fixed effects, as well as 1999 Economic Census variables at 
the municipality level interacted with a linear time trend. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the municipality level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *10 percent, 
**5 percent, ***1 percent. 
 